by Dmitry Ivanovich Rublev, candidate of historical sciences, docent of the Russian State
Agrarian University – Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy

The start of the First World War forced anarchists to define their own position and act in
conformity with it in making decisions about practical work.1 The words of one of their
leaders, V. M. Voline, would undoubtedly have echoed those of many political activists of
that time: “This war represents, any way you look at it, a phenomenon on an historically
immense scale. Its consequences cannot be confined within the limits of the war itself. Its
countless and profound reverberations will spread in all directions over a period of many
years. It will leave a deep imprint on the whole 20th century. It will be, of course, the
beginning of a whole new era – an era protracted and colossal both as to its scope and as to its
content and consequences. . . . The war is, in itself, only the prelude to a whole series of
large-scale upheavals, displacements, transformations and insurgencies…. For by rocking to
its foundations the swamp that is the historical life of nations, a swamp which was stable but
beginning to decay here and there, the war has stirred up in its stagnant waters more than one
storm, more than one hurricane. . . .”2
Prior to 1914 no single event had caused such a sharp demarcation among anarchists. Authors
writing in the mainstream of official Soviet historiography in the 1920s and 1930s denied any
sort of anti-war activity on the part of anarchists in 1914–1917.3 But by the 1960s to 1980s,
such activity was covered in general works on the history of Russian anarchism.4 Since the
beginning of the 1990s, new works have appeared devoted to analyzing the views and actions
of ideologists and participants of the anarchist movement in the capitals and individual
regions of the Russian Empire,5 However, a comprehensive study of the anti-war efforts of
the anarchists has not been produced. Moreover, most historians still ignore the activities of
emigrant anarchist organizations, although the controversies unfolding in exile also had their
effect on those who remained in Russia.
1
In the late 19th – early 20th centuries, anti-militarism was an important component of the
ideology of anarchism. Kropotkin denounced modern wars as the struggle of capitalist elites
for spheres of economic influence. Judging by his arguments in Words of a Rebel (1885) and
Modern Science and Anarchism (1913), his views remained unchanged for many years.6 In
1885 he wrote: “When we fight today, it is to guarantee our great industrialists a profit of
30%, to assure the financial barons their domination at the Bourse, and to provide the
shareholders of mines and railways with their incomes of tens of millions of dollars. . . .
Opening new markets, imposing one’s own merchandise, whether good or bad, is the basis of
all present-day politics. . . .”7 “The reason for modern war is always one and the same,” he
declared in 1913, “it is the competition for markets and the right to exploit nations backward
in industry. . . . In fact, all wars in Europe during the last 150 years were wars fought for trade
advantages and the rights of exploitation.”8 At the same time, Kropotkin did not distinguish
between the great powers. The prevention of war, according to theorists of anarchism, should
be effected by propagandizing desertion, and in the event a mobilization was announced, the
workers of the belligerent countries should launch a general strike, which could develop into
an anarchist social revolution.9 It’s impossible to agree that thinking about “practical steps
and measures in the event of a large-scale war, like World War I,” “did not find serious
reflection in the theory of anarchism.”10 The Russo-Japanese War confirmed the antimilitarist
stance of the Russian anarchists. Kropotkin condemned the plans of aggression of
both sides. “Real war,” he asserted, “is the triumph of the basest capitalist instincts, against
which any thinking person must fight.”11 This position was shared by the Russian anarchist
organizations. Thus, the anarcho-communists of Białystok, laying the blame for the conflict
with Japan on “the owners” and the state, called upon the workers, peasants, and “lumpenproletarians”
to disrupt mobilization and disorganize military industry and transport. They
expected that the mass anti-war movement would grow into a revolution: “Appropriate all
wealth for common use – set up communes, thereby annihilating the state, so the communes
will be stateless. . . . Let the homeless organize bands to attack private property; let the
workers organize strikes and riots, and the peasants seize the land and stocks by force –
taking everything they need. Attack the government agencies protecting capital, and refuse to
pay taxes and duties.”12 Thus the Russian anarchists developed and propagandized a system
of actions under conditions of war.
In studying anarchist defencism,13 researchers focus on support for the countries of the
Entente, viewed as defending democratic gains of the workers from Germany’s militarism
and conservative values. But among the anarchists there were also defencists of the pro-
German type, such as Eric Mühsam and Bruno Wille (Germany), and Michael Cohn (USA).14
According to the political prisoner F. M. Puchkov, among the “anarchist-expropriators” found
in Russian prisons there were many “Germanophiles,” pinning their hopes for amnesty on a
German victory.15 However, this position was neither widespread nor represented in the
Russian-language press. The Russian defencists supported the positions of P. A. Kropotkin. In
his first “Letter about current events,” published in September 1914 in the newspaper
Russkie Vedomosti [Russian Gazette], he appealed to the Russian public to “help Europe
2
crush German militarism and German imperialist aggression – the enemy of our most
cherished covenants.”16 An Allied victory, he believed, would lead to the re-organization of
states on a federal basis and the granting of independence or autonomy to national
minorities.17 This appeal by the acknowledged leader of the international anarchist movement
shocked many of his followers. Some, like Saul Yanovsky, one of the prominent figures of
the anarchist movement in the USA, blamed Kropotkin for preventing the anarchists from
presenting a united front against the War, thereby strengthening their influence: “I can’t make
sense of him in a positive way. . . . How nice it would be if we could make use of the war for
our ideas, if only he and some others hadn’t suddenly become such flaming patriots!”18
Among the defencists there were other well-known anarchists: V. N. Cherkezov, M. I.
Goldsmit, A. A. Borovoy, S. M. Romanov, V. V. Barmash, and B. A. Verkhoustinsky.
Anarchist defencism was a very contradictory phenomenon. While the writings of Kropotkin
and Goldsmit were not chauvinistic, on the other hand Borovoy in his article “The War,”
published in 1914 in the newspaper Nov’ [Virgin Soil], contrasted the good nature of the
Slavs with the belligerence of the Germans: “Russia is traditionally a peace-loving country –
gentle, quick to overlook an insult, laid-back, and easy-going in the Slavic fashion . . . . There
has to be a direct and terrible threat to our freedom in order to arouse us. It took everything
solemn and dull in the German national character to raise us to a boil. And now we must boil
with anger and hatred, for this anger and hatred of ours is sacred.”19 Expressing his hatred for
the Germans, Cherkezov argued that since time immemorial, aggressiveness and hatred of the
Slavic and Romance peoples had been congenital to them. He denied any importance for
world progress for the achievements of German culture and science, claiming that the
advanced ideas and discoveries of the Germans were borrowed from the English and
French.20 On February 28 1916, the position of the pro-Entente defencists received its
generalized formulation in the “Manifesto of the Sixteen,” signed by 15 anarchists (a place
name was wrongly identified as a person). Laying the blame for launching the war on
Germany, they called on German workers to overthrow the Kaiser and renounce annexations.
All anarchists were encouraged to assist the armed forces of the Entente.21 An example of
such activity Kropotkin considered the patrolling of the shores of England by fishermenvolunteers
to ensure the delivery of food.22
There exist various explanations for the origins of anarchist defencism. P. N Milyukov
believed that Kropotkin had always been a patriot and recalled meeting him on 10 February
1904: “We found Kropotkin in a state of terrible agitation and indignation at Japanese
treachery. . . . How could it be that this foe of Russian policy, and in general any war, turned
out to be a thoroughgoing Russian patriot? Kropotkin immediately won me over to his
position, a position which he held without qualification, as if it was the voice of instinct – of
national sentiment – which he was vocalizing.”23 According to I. S. Knizhnik-Vetrov, at the
London congress of anarcho-communists (“khlebovoltsi”) in 1906, Kropotkin quashed an
anti-war resolution: “He suggested the possibility of a German attack on Russia, called
Wilhelm II a ‘crowned gendarme,’ and spoke about Wilhelm’s insidious plans with great
3
hatred.”24 Kropotkin’s Francophilia played a role in the formation of his “defencist”
position.25 The sympathies of the Russian anarchists for France had an ideological basis. The
French revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries determined the political development of the
countries of Europe to a significant degree. In the 1870s the ideas of Bakuninism and
Proudhonism were widely disseminated in France, and anarchists regarded the Paris
Commune of 1871 as an example of an anti-authoritarian organization of society.26 The
militant acts of Ravachol, Auguste Vaillant, and Émile Henry influenced the tactics of certain
currents of anarcho-communists (the “chernoznamentsi” and “beznachaltsi”). The
revolutionary syndicalist unions of France were considered by many anarchists in Russia to
be the model of a radical labour movement. In 1914 not only defencists, but also some
internationalists, did not hide their preference. “Needless to say,” admitted A. A. Karelin,
“our sympathies are with the French.”27
The position of the defencists was also influenced by the ideas of M. A. Bakunin during the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871.28 Having a strong anti-German bias (he even identified
German culture with authoritarian militarist ideology), Bakunin predicted catastrophe in the
event of the defeat of France.29 “I came [to Lyon],” he declared, “because I’m deeply
convinced that the cause of France is again the cause of humanity, and that her fall, and her
enslavement by a regime which will be imposed on her by Prussian bayonets, would be the
greatest misfortune in terms of freedom and human progress.”30
“One thing is certain beyond the shadow of a doubt,” argued Kropotkin in 1914. “If Germany
triumphs, the war will not bring liberation; it will bring Europe new and even more severe
enslavement. The rulers of Germany are not keeping this under wraps. They themselves have
announced that they started the war with goals of conquest.”31 Kropotkin also began to divide
the warring states into oppressors and freedom fighters. Thus, in one of his conversations
during the First Balkan War, he claimed that “victory of the Slavs over Turkey and the
disappearance of Turkey as a State should be welcomed as a victory for statelessness: at least
one State would have disappeared from the face of the earth.”32 As a rule, defencists
recognized the usefulness of national-liberation movements in terms of their “radicalization
and moving things along the social-revolutionary rails.”33
However, it’s hardly correct to associate defencism solely with personal sympathies and the
influence of theoreticians. Crucial was the objective state of the labour movement. Before the
war, the revolutionary-syndicalist unions of France, upon which the majority of Russian
anarchists pinned their hopes for revolution in Europe, were in a noticeable state of decline.
The stabilization of the standard of living, and the growth in earnings brought about by the
development of industry, led to a lessening of the radicalism of both the tactics and the
demands of strikers. The tendency of the leaders of the Confédération générale du travail
(CGT) to seek negotiated solutions to conflicts increased, and the influence of the CGT’s
reformist wing became stronger.34 In the countries which entered the First World War, the
masses were overwhelmed by a wave of patriotic fervour. “The tidal wave passed and we
4
were swept away,” wrote the anarchist Pierre Monatte.35 “We were totally confused, lost our
heads,” confessed Alphonse Merrheim, leader of the CGT’s internationalist opposition. “How
come? Because at that point the working class of Paris, caught up in an overwhelming
paroxysm of nationalism, would not have allowed the security forces the bother of shooting
us. They would have shot us themselves.”36 As a result, the CGT refused to declare a strike in
response to the outbreak of war, urging workers to “defend the nation”37. Patriotic zeal,
accompanied by mass demonstrations and anti-German riots in the cities, was observed in
Russia as well. As the Bolshevik journalist A. T. Radzishevsky recalled: “On July 19 (Old
Style) the war started, damaging the revolutionary mood and weakening it tremendously.
Tens of thousands of workers and hundreds of thousands of citizens who had previously
sympathized with the movement, were completely befuddled and dutifully made their way to
the recruiting depots.”38 In 1914 the strikes which took place in Russia in the vast majority of
cases were not anti-war in character, but were associated with economic demands.39
However, Kropotkin’s position was not supported by the majority of Russian anarchists,
either in exile or in Russia. The defencists didn’t even have their own journal in the Russian
language. Rejection of Kropotkin’s stance was largely due to the tradition, important for
anarchists, of opposition to militarism and the state. To abandon this tradition was impossible.
In addition, defencism implied at least a temporary collaboration with the government of
Nicholas II, which would benefit from the ideas of the defencists.40 And that, in itself, was
unacceptable to anarchists.
The opinion of the internationalists was expressed in the “International Anarchist Manifesto
on the War,” signed by 37 anarchists (including the Russian anarchists Bill Shatov, Iuda
Grossman and Alexander Schapiro). Its authors characterized the war as imperialist, noting
that both sides were pursuing annexationist goals. Responsibility for unleashing the war was
attributed to capitalists, landlords, and bureaucrats; an armed insurrection was seen as the
only means of putting an end to military activity, an insurrection which would develop into a
global social revolution, eliminating the root causes of international conflicts – the state and
capitalist relations.41 Anarchist groups and periodicals repeatedly expressed these sentiments.
Thus, the newspaper Rabocheye znamya [The Banner of labour] called for “a forcible end to
the war by the collective will of the working classes,” the propagandizing of anarchist
communism, and the creation of an International of labour organizations “on the basis of antistatism,
anti-patriotism, and anti-militarism.”42 The general strike was recognized in editorials
of Golos Truda [The Voice of Labour] as an effective means of struggle against war and
militarism,43 and the defeat of the Russian Army was considered, by analogy with the events
of 1905, as a factor contributing to the unfolding of the revolution.44 “First of all, and the
sooner the better – revolution, followed by, or coincident with it, a revolutionary war of
liberation against all forms of violence and against all those who traffic in it – Russian,
German, and the rest”, wrote V. M. Voline.45
5
The vast majority of supporters of the “International Anarchist Manifesto on the War”
(Vsevolod Voline, Gregory Raiva, Alexander Ge, etc.) shared the ideas of cosmopolitanism,
most consistently developed by Ge. In his opinion, the patriotic stance of socialists was a
logical consequence of their recognition of the right of nations to self-determination.46 In the
ideology of national liberation movements, Ge saw “elements which could potentially
become nationalistic in time.”47 On the contrary, it seemed to him that the causes of war could
be eliminated only by “internationalizing all cultural values and by the cultural assimilation
of all civilized peoples.” He hoped that the coming social revolution would lead to the
surmounting of national sentiments, thereby providing equal access of people to the
achievements of contemporary culture.48 In contrast, another ideologue of the anti-war
fraction of anarchists, Georgi Gogelia, expressed his misgivings concerning inter-ethnic
relations in Transcaucasia. Denouncing the aggressive aspirations of the Entente powers, he
accused the Russian government of trying to annihilate the Georgian people with the help of
Armenian immigration: “After Armenia was annexed by Russia . . . a huge emigration of
Armenians to Georgia was begun, to the industrial centre, intensifying the artificial mixing up
of peoples long practiced so diligently by tsarist Russia . . . . At the hands of the ‘liberator of
peoples,’ Georgians await the unhappy fate that befell the Jews – the loss of their territory.”49
Most internationalists sympathized with Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and V. I. Lenin.50
But there were also those who maintained the traditional skepticism toward socialdemocracy.
Thus, in April 1915 in the pages of Strana polnochi [Country of midnight], an
information bulletin published by Apollon Karelin, a member of the Brotherhood of Free
Communalists implied that the antiwar protests of Liebknecht’s supporters were insincere.51
Karelin himself advocated reconciliation with the anarchist-defencists. While indirectly
acknowledging Kropotkin’s correctness in a letter to him, Karelin explained his own position
as based on opportunist motives and the desire to be in the vanguard of the revolutionary
movement: “My dear teacher, I read your letters about the war and saw the full force of your
arguments . . . . But . . . if we – my comrades and I – endorsed your point of view, there
would be no one to carry our black banners in the daily struggle which will begin
immediately after the war.”52 In 1916 Karelin openly justified the position of the defencists:
“P. A. Kropotkin, without changing his opinions in the slightest, regarded the current war as a
phenomenon which we cannot prevent and from which we must derive as much benefit as
possible . . . . While protesting against the war, it’s possible to come to the conclusion that we
must take part in it . . . . Kropotkin’s sympathizers, gun in hand, go at the Germans because
they are convinced that a German victory will delay the triumph of our doctrine by a century,
i.e. will not be a lesser evil than the death of any of us!”53
The ideas of the internationalists found expression in the following periodicals of the Russian
anarchist diaspora: Golos Truda (New York, 1911–1917), Nabat [The Tocsin] (Geneva,
1914–1916), Rabocheye Znamya [The Workers’ Banner] (Lausanne,1915–1917),
Rabochaya Mysl’ [Labour Views] (New York, 1916–1916), and Vostochnaya Zarya [Eastern
Dawn] (Pittsburgh, 1916). The most important organizations of anarchist-emigrants were
6
under their influence, especially the Federation of the Unions of Russian Workers of the USA
and Canada (FSRR) [often referred to as simply the Union of Russian Workers (URW)].
Founded at a constitutional congress in Detroit on July 1–6 1914, it was composed of 24
North American anarchist organizations with a total membership of more than 600. Adopting
an anarchist program, the FSRR published anarchist literature and rendered aid to anarchists
in Russia. Golos Truda was the mouthpiece of the Federation. Since the newspaper published
the best anarchist writers, the quality of its anti-war materials increased, as well as its
popularity among emigrants in America and Europe. In 1911–1914, its reach extended also to
Russian territory. The Moscow Groups of Anarcho-Syndicalists (MGAS) maintained contact
with Golos Truda. According to Lazar Lazarev, it was under the influence of its antimilitarist
articles that members of the FSRR refused to register for military service and
evaded conscription into the American army, resulting in arrests and prison sentences (in
some cases, up to 5–10 years).54
The anarchist diaspora in Europe did not have a unique centre. The most influential groups of
Russian anarcho-communists were Volnaya Volya [Free Will] (England); Trud [Labour], and
Bratstvo Vol’nykh obshchinnikov [The Brotherhood of Free communalists] (France); Nabat
[The Tocsin] and Rabochiy mir [Worker’s world] (Switzerland). Each group was composed
of 5–30 individuals.55 Their press organs were Rabocheye Znamya and Nabat. In March
1915 Karelin published one issue of the bulletin Strana polnochi. In contrast to Golos Truda,
these publications were issued irregularly and seldom reached Russia. In addition, as Lydia
Ikonnikova-Gogelia recalled, the French police already in 1914 had a list of Russian antimilitarists.
On August 3–4, after mobilization had been declared, arrests were carried out
among them involving searches and the confiscation of documents.56 In 1916 V. M. Voline
was persecuted for propaganda against the war; after being arrested, he spent several months
in an internment camp. Being then expelled from the country, in August 1916 he was
compelled to move to the USA.57
Emigré groups distributed anti-war leaflets. In April 1915 the Genevan Nabat came out with
the proclamation “First of May. Citizens!” In 1916 five more leaflets appeared: “Protest”
(Zürich Rabochiy mir); “On the Latest News” and “Response” (Geneva); “Protest” (Paris);
and “To all the oppressed.”58 The last leaflet was published in October – November 1916 in
various printshops in Stockholm. The press run was several thousand copies, part of which
was confiscated by the Swedish police. The Russian military attaché in Sweden even
suggested that the leaflet was the handiwork of German intelligence; however, this allegation
was not confirmed.59
Campaigning against the war, activists of the FSRR organized lecture tours and debates with
defencists (Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries). Thus, in late 1915, N. Mukhin
lectured in Chicago and Cleveland, and in March 1916 his speech on “The War, Patriotism
and the Fatherland” was heard in Detroit and Rochester. In early September 1915, L. Lazarev
explained “The Relationship of P. Kropotkin to the European War” in Detroit. In the autumn
7
of 1916, the Federation organized a lecture tour for G. Raiva through Bridgeport, Chester,
Cleveland, and Detroit, where he talked about the war and plans for the creation of a new
International. In November 1916 – January 1917, V. Voline travelled to Cleveland, Chicago,
and Detroit, sharing his thoughts on anarchism, syndicalism, war, and the general strike.60
An important activity of emigrants was smuggling agitators and literature into Russia, after
normal connections had been disrupted by the war. In September 1915, the editors of
Rabocheye Znamya announced the collection of funds for this purpose.61 Nikolai Petrov-
Pavlov, living in the Japanese possession Dairen, near the Russian sphere of influence in
Manchuria, smuggled the publications of Russian emigrant-anarchists into Russia through
Harbin, and also by means of sailors from Vladivostok. In 1915 alone he was able to send
part of the press run of the journal Nabat across the border, along with the brochures Novoye
Yevangeliye [The New Gospel] and Za mir [For peace].62 In Petrograd, anarchist publications
were received through Arkhangelsk (probably with the help of sailors of merchant ships).63
Acording to Lazarev, in 1915 the editors of Golos Truda created several propaganda groups
in Russia. In the spring of 1916 some of their activists returned to their native land to
distribute newspapers and establish contacts.64 In November 1916, for example, Sherbanenko,
a company clerk of the 28th Reserve Infantry Battalion in Kharkov, received a brochure from
America entitled “For whom is the soldier fighting?” encouraging the refusal of military
service.65 Agitational materials also made their way into Russia through the Anarchist Red
Cross (AKK), based in New York. Starting in 1913, the AKK collected and remitted funds to
political prisoners and exiles in 25 locations in Russia. Thanks to its efforts, a questionnaire
was distributed to prisons and places of exile to determine the opinions of prisoners and
exiles about the First World War. Subsequently, the results of this survey were released,
indicating the anti-war sentiments of the majority of the respondents.66
Emigrants also helped Russian deserters. This type of assistance was organized by Petrov-
Pavlov. Funds were directed through his address for sustainment and travel expenses to
Japan, Australia, and America for fugitives from military service. Correspondence with their
relatives was also forwarded through the same address. This was financed by donations of
anarchists and Bundists living in the USA, and also by the relatives of deserters and fugitive
political prisoners. In February 1916, Petrov-Pavlov petitioned the Japanese government for
permission for around 50 deserters in Dairen to move to Korean territory.67 He also carried on
correspondence with exiles living in Siberia (anarchists and social-democrats), sending some
of them money and anarchist literature, and helping them to make their way abroad
illegally.68 In 1915 the content of his correspondence was discovered by the French military
censor, and at the end of October 1916, Petrov-Pavov was arrested by the Japanese police at
the request of the Russian consul and extradited to Russia.69
The anarchist movement experienced an upswing in 1914–1917 on the territory of the
Russian Empire. If in 1914–1915 their groups (with half a dozen up to 50 members) were
active in eight or nine cities, by 1916 – early 1917 the movement already had a presence in
8
17 cities.70 The most numerous concentrations were in Petrograd (in 1916 there were six
organizations with a total of 100 members)71 and Moscow (in 1916 – seven groups and 73
participants).72 In total, according to the data of V. V. Krivenky, there were about 300
anarchists in Russia at the beginning of 1917. A process of gradual consolidation of the
movement took place, creating major centres. Thus, in the spring of 1914, the “Group of
Exiled Anarcho-Communists of Eastern Siberia” appeared, bringing together several dozen
individuals.73 In Petrograd, the city-wide Northern Union of Anarchists and Northern Group
of Anarchists, uniting the district organizations of the capital, were formed in 1914 and 1916,
respectively. There was a marked tendency to establish interregional connections. Thus, in
1914–1916. emissaries from Petrograd visited Baku, Briansk, Yekaterinoslav, Kiev, Moscow,
Odessa, Tula, and Kharkov.74 In 1916 the leader of the United Groups of Anarchists of the
Vyborg District [Petrograd] created an organization in Moscow.75 Early in 1917, the Petrograd
anarchist N. Lebedev formed an underground circle of workers in Kazan.76 In December 1914
and the autumn of 1916, unsuccessful attempts were undertaken to hold a national congress
of Russian anarchists.77
The anti-war activities of anarchist organizations in Russia were primarily in the field of
propaganda. Under the conditions of underground work, it was difficult to conduct such
propaganda orally and in public. This situation is illustrated by an episode from the life of V.
A. Posse, a journalist and well known publicist of the ideas of pacifist anarchism,
revolutionary syndicalism, and cooperative activities. In August 1914, during a lecture tour to
the cities of the Volga and Ural regions, he visited Sarapul. Here he delivered a lecture about
Germany and the Germans, debunking propaganda myths: “I pointed out that war in general
is nasty, mean, and cruel, but that the Germans are no more savages than the English, the
French, or us, the Russians. I evoked the geniuses of German literature, art, and science,
recalled what we had learned from the Germans, and expressed confidence that after the war
we would be friends with the Germans, that we would learn from each other not to fight, but
to work and create. I warned against the harassment of Germans living in Russia as innocent
of the crimes of Wilhelm.”78 The lecture led to the persecution of Posse in the local Black
Hundreds press, where he was almost openly called a German and Austro-Hungarian spy. At
his next lecture police officers showed up in large numbers. A day later, immediately after a
sermon in the local cathedral by Archbishop Ambrose, leader of the local Black Hundreds, a
crowd of parishioners tried to lynch Posse in the nearby town square. Only the intervention of
a court official, who happened to be in the vicinity, saved the life of the anti-militarist
lecturer. By an order of the governor of Viatka province, where Sarapul was located, Posse
was hit with a heavy fine. Then the Minister of the Interior imposed a ban on Posse’s
lecturing activities until the spring of 1916.79
Nevertheless, the anarchists tried to conduct propaganda at mass meetings. Thus, on August
15 1916, A. Skvortsov and S. Levin spoke at an illegal gathering of workers of Kharkov
plants, declaring that the war was in the interests of the capitalists, who were getting rich at
the expense of the proletariat. In an effort to demolish the arguments of the defencists, they
9
insisted that in the event of victory by the Entente, the material situation of the workers
would worsen as a result of Russia’s huge debt to its allies. On October 11 1916, Skvortsov
took part in student demonstrations in Kharkov, shouting the slogan “Down with the War,
Long Live the Revolution!”80
More noticeable was printed propaganda. According to P. O. Korotich, in 1914–1916 at least
27 anarchist leaflets and proclamations were published in Russia.81 As a rule, they were
duplicated by hectograph or shapirograph. Quite often handwritten leaflets were distributed.
Only rarely were groups able to set up underground printshops. Thus, the Moscow Groups of
Anarcho-Syndicalists, jointly with the Bolsheviks, acquired a mimeograph machine, and then
expropriated a press from a printing establishment. Attempts to publish periodicals were
made on several occasions: in 1914–1915 the “Group of Labour Anarcho-Communists” in
Petrograd published one issue of the bulletin Anarkhia,82 and the Northern Union of
Anarchists published two issues of the journal Anarkhist, printed by hectograph. In addition,
the Northern Group of Anarchists published the propaganda brochures “Fundamentals of
Anarchism” and “Three Enemies: Hunger, Ignorance and Fear”83 in 1915.
The first anti-militarist leaflets appeared already in the autumn of 1914. The most famous of
them were: “To soldiers!” (October, Irkutsk) and “To all workers” (November, St.
Petersburg).84 During the period August 1914 to January 1917, the Petrograd anarchists alone
produced 13 leaflets (in 1914 – 1, in 1915 – 9, in 1916 – 3).85 It’s possible to gauge the
number of copies in circulation by police reports. Thus, during searches and arrests among
the members of the Group of Worker Anarcho-Communists in Petrograd, 100 copies of the
appeal “Comrades! Ten years ago. . .” and 85 copies of “The War and Revolution”86 were
confiscated. Circulation of leaflets produced by the Moscow Groups of Anarcho-Syndicalists
were in the 1,000 – 2,000 range.87 These leaflets were addressed mainly to workers and
distributed at worksites. In particular, in August 1915 the leaflets of the Northern Group of
Anarchists “Concerning the War” and “Comrades! Working Russia and the Russian
Proletariat. . .” were read at the Putilov metalworking plant, the Baltic shipbuilding works,
and the Petrograd Mechanical plant.88 During the winter and spring of 1916, anarchists
arriving in Moscow from Petrograd under the direction of V. I. Fyodorov handed out the
brochures “Fundamentals of Anarchism” and “The March against the War” at the Military-
Industrial Plant No. 1, as well as at the “Dynamo”, “Dux,” “Dobrov & Nabgolts,” and “Bara”
plants89. In September 1916 leaflets appeared in Moscow at the Mikhelson and Dux plants
and at the Sokolniki streetcar shops. According to the police, “some of the workers reacted
sympathetically to the leaflets”90. Labour conflicts were regularly exploited for propaganda
purposes. For example, on October 27 1915 during a strike at the “Phoenix” plant in
Petrograd, an appeal was distributed calling for stopping the war by means of a social
revolution91.
Most leaflets indicated their target audience (“To all workers,” “Workers!,” “Brother
soldiers!,” “Comrade workers!,” “Pipefitters!,” “Working men and women!”92) and broadcast
10
slogans (“Down with the War!,” “Down with your bloody wars!,” etc.93). They contained a
candid assessment of the progress of the war, characterized in terms such as “a bloody game
of governments,” “fratricidal war,” “an immense worldwide slaughter,” etc.94 The situation of
Russia was portrayed as catastrophic: “The losses of our troops exceed two million. Each day
of war incurs over 40,000 casualties and costs 200 million [rubles].”95 A new note sounding
in anarchist propaganda was the accusation of treason, found in a particularly strident form in
a MGAS leaflet distributed in November 1916 entitled “The Liberation of the workers must
be dealt with by the workers themselves.” “We remember,” the leaflet said, “the names of
Sukhomlinov and Myasoedov, whose treason contributed to the more efficient destruction of
the Russian army. We know that treason has found a home in the royal palace, and around the
young tsarina are grouped a circle of Germanophiles with agents in neutral countries. That is
why there is such a ruthless extermination of Russian workers and peasants at the Front. That
is why our losses have attained such terrible numbers – almost nine million people, more than
the losses of Germany and Austria combined.”96
This MGAS leaflet is interesting because it includes the strategy for political struggle which
led to the toppling of Nicholas II from the throne in the February Days of 1917. Accusing the
government of failing to solve the “food crisis,” the leaflet predicted the imminence of
starvation if public initiative was stifled by actions of the bureaucracy. For their own part, the
authors of the leaflet proposed that workers take advantage of the conflict between the State
Duma and Nicholas II: “Comrades, we urge you again to take in your hands the glorious
weapon of proletarian struggle and strike a decisive blow to your worst enemy. Let the
opening day of the State Duma be marked by a general strike of the Moscow proletariat. On
this day the bourgeoisie is preparing to exert pressure from the parliamentary rostrum and
thus our sworn enemy will be dealt blows from both sides.”97 Thus the struggle for the
anarchist ideal was shifted to a distant future (unusual for anarchists in the early 20th century),
and the immediate goals announced to be the overthrow of the autocracy, the cessation of the
war, and the granting of political freedoms and an amnesty.98
Propaganda work in the army and in the fleet was carried on by the well known anarchists A.
A. Borovoy, A. G. Zhelezniakov, G. P. Maximoff, et al. “I had already made up my mind
about a question which had been tormenting me,” recalled Maximoff, who had the option of
an exemption from military service. “Rather than avoid mobilization, I would go as a soldier
and live together with the people under the same conditions, sharing all their hardships and
carrying on anti-war and political propaganda in the barracks.”99 In 1915 he became a
volunteer non-combatant in the 176th reserve infantry regiment, stationed in Krasnoye Selo
near Petrograd. There Maximoff talked to soldiers, criticizing the war and the policies of
Nicholas II, and carefully explaining the ideas of anarchist self-management. As one of the
most literate, he won the confidence of the lower ranks of his company, and was sent by them
to see the deputy of the State Duma Alexander Kerensky with a petition against the use of
corporal punishment by commanders.100 A. Zhelezniakov served in the 2nd Baltic naval depot
in 1915–1916, and then on the training vessel “Okean.” In his letters he informed the
11
Moscow anarchists about the morale of the sailors and his own activity (he was able to set up
a system of distributing leaflets and literature to servicemen).101 In 1915 the “Group of
Worker Anarcho-Communists” inserted their leaflets in newspapers in an effort to deliver
them to soldiers.102 The smuggling of anti-war leaflets to the Front and the delivery of
weapons in the reverse direction was carried out by members of MGAS.103 The Northern
Union of Anarchists hoped to recruit soldiers for attempts on the lives of the high command
staff. For this purpose in 1916, it was planned to create combat groups from members of the
Petrograd garrison.104
The appeals addressed to soldiers first of all mentioned the hardships of the war and ascribed
the responsibility for them to the tsarist government and the capitalists: “You, soldiers, have
shed your blood for the interests of the tsar and capitalism, and you, doomed to perish, are
forced to starve and freeze in the trenches, dressed in miserable rags, and treated like ‘cannon
fodder’ and a ‘pile of shit.’”105 The leaflets suggested that “the lives and health of the soldiers
themselves are considered by the command to be less valuable than bullets”; “and what a vile
attitude the government has towards the wounded, what pitiful handouts are tossed their way
by plump gentlemen, and what outrageous restrictions are put on the benefits available to
casualties of war.”106 The deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the country was
closely linked with the conduct of the war: “At the same time, all the material burdens of the
war fall on the poor; taxes grow at an incredible rate, and so do the appetites of the
manufacturers and merchants, who are inflating the cost of goods, engaging in
embezzlement, impoverishing the families of reservists, starving the unemployed.”107 Pointed
out especially was the harsh treatment meted out by the authorities to those in the rear: “Your
blood has been poured out on the great killing fields of people who have been set against one
another by the emperors and governments of all the belligerent states. This is being done in
the name of despotic power and in the name of the capitalistic bourgeoisie, which, while the
guns roar and the people’s blood flows, are robbing your wives, fathers and mothers. And for
any attempt at protest, the police, on the orders of the government, shoot unarmed workers,
women, the elderly, and children.” Thus the repression was blamed on the police, not on
soldiers.108 In these appeals, false rumours were propagated, clearly at odds with the defeatist
position of the anarchists: “They say our traitorous generals, headed by the Tsarina Maria,
sold Germany our plans for military operations; and this betrayal cost our ravaged country
dearly. Millions of human lives have been exposed to certain death thanks to the treacherous
government and generals.”109 There were also reports about social unrest among workers and
soldiers in Austro-Hungary and Germany, which were taken as evidence of impending
revolution.110 “In order to put an end to the reckless behaviour of predators who are leading
the masses to subject to them to mass slaughter, it is necessary to destroy the state . . . ,” it
was stated in leaflets. “The labouring masses are faced with the task of destroying the
capitalist system and annihilating the state by means of violent revolution, and seizing the
land, the factories, and all the belongings of the upper class and making them available for
common use.”111
12
In an effort to expand the number of their supporters, the anarchists helped deserters. In 1916,
a report of the Petrograd Okhrana noted that “the highest percentage of the membership of
anarchist groups are the soldiers-deserters, as well as people evading compulsory military
service and living illegally.”112 According to the police, “these people, enticed by the prospect
of having their living expenses paid by an organization, willingly join anarchist groups, are
trained as cadres, and obediently carry out expropriations as directed.”113 Meanwhile, there
was a “significant number of deserters living in the capital without any visible means of
support.” Anarchists were able to provide them not only with money, but also false
documents.114 Thus, A. Tyukhanov, while being supported by MGAS in the summer of 1914,
arranged for the production in one of the printshops of “white tickets” (certificates of
exemption from military service), for distribution among anarchists and their sympathizers
who wanted to avoid conscription.115 Passport books and other documents were also prepared.
So, when an apartment in Petrograd was searched on March 16 1916, the anarchist P. D.
Filimoshkin was caught manufacturing fake graduation diplomas from the Bogorodsky
Elementary School.116
There are also instances of anarchists deserting from the army and navy. For example, in June
1915, a group of anarchists in Moscow, made up of Latvian bootmakers organized by
Belevsky-Berzin, planned the escape of the Anarchist Gayl, who had been drafted into the
army.117 In August 1915, K. A. Tsesnik, a private in the 143rd Dorogobuzhsky Infantry
Regiment, escaped from the Peter the Great Hospital in Moscow. Later Tsesnik would
become an activist of the anarchist group in Kharkov. On May 30 1916, the anarchist E. P.
Rudzinsky deserted from the 29th Infantry Reserve Regiment.118 In 1916, Zhelezniakov
escaped from the training ship “Okean.”
In their anti-war activities, the anarchists found common ground for collaborating with the
socialist parties. As early as the autumn of 1914, anarchists, SRs, and social-democrats in
Kharkov discussed the joint publishing of anti-war leaflets. In early February 1915, there
were meetings in Moscow of anarchists, SRs and anarcho-syndicalists who opposed the
war.119 However, due to differences between them, these meetings did not lead to results. The
prerequisites for mutual action were more favourable in prisons and places of exile, where
conditions of living together and struggling for prisoners’ rights united representatives of
various ideological tendencies. In 1916, some exiled anarchists in Tomsk joined a Military-
Socialist Union which included Bolsheviks, SRs, and Mensheviks.120 In the Khersonskaya
hard labour [katorga] prison, anarchists took part in a survey of attitudes to the First World
War, its characteristics, and expected outcomes, organized by the SR-Maximalist B.
Zhadanovsky. The survey revealed a preponderance of internationalist, defeatist attitudes. In
the spring of 1916, the Kherson katorzhniks put out an illegal handwritten journal
Svobodnyye mysli [Free thoughts], which included discussions about the war. Among its
writers and creators were the anarchists A. N. Andreyev, Vinokurov, and K. Kasparov.121
13
Thus, during the First World War, anti-militarist propaganda occupied an important place in
the activities of Russian anarchists, contributing to the spread of their influence and the
growth of the movement among workers, employees and deserters, who filled the ranks of the
anarchist organizations. No less important was the active work among soldiers and sailors.
It’s significant that during this period some of the anarchists advocated a strategy of struggle
which was applied in the February days of 1917.
* * * * *
14
Commentary (added by the author for the English edition of this essay):
Khlebovoltsi – an anarcho-communist tendency in Russian anarchism in the early 20th century. Its name derived
from the newspaper Khleb i Volya [Bread and Freedom] published in 1903–1905. The leading theoreticians
of this tendency were P. A. Kropotkin, G. I. Gogelia, and M. I. Goldsmit. They believed that the immediate
goal of the impending revolution should be a stateless communist system. The khlebovoltsi endorsed
methods of struggle aimed at transforming the anarchist movement into a mass movement: economic strikes,
acts of individual (including worksite) terror, sabotage, and armed revolts. The emphasis was on the
organization of strikes and revolts as a means for workers and peasants to achieve partial improvements in
their economic situation. Also encouraged was the struggle for political freedoms (but not for
parliamentarism or a constitution) by means of revolutionary methods. Kropotkin, Gogelia, and Goldsmit
imagined the social revolution in the form of a general strike with the seizure of the means of production,
leading to an armed uprising which would result in the elimination of state power and private property, and
the immediate re-organization of society on the basis of anarcho-communism. The role of organizing the
“free communist society” was to be filled by the labour unions (syndicates) created in the development of
the labour movement. Inspired by the experience of the labour movement in France, as well as the
outstanding successes of general strikes and the appearance of the first trade unions in Russia, the anarchocommunist
khlebovoltsi in 1905–1907 pushed for the wider application of the revolutionary-syndicalist
strategy of struggle. In their writings, P. Kropotkin, G. Gogelia, and M. Goldsmit encouraged anarchists to
create labour unions which were independent of the political parties, unions which were based on the
organizational principles of self-management and federalism, and used the tactic of “direct action” (the
struggle of workers on behalf of their own socio-economic interests without recourse to organs of state
power or political parties). By taking part in the everyday struggles of workers and propagandizing anarchist
ideas, the anarchists were to prepare the labour unions for their role as the basic organizational force of the
social revolution and the organizers of production in the future anarcho-communist society. The culmination
of this work was to be the creation of an All-Russian trade union federation based on the principles of
revolutionary syndicalism. While acknowledging syndicalism as the key strategy of the anarchist movement,
the khlebovoltsi proposed to combine various forms of struggle, and envisaged the parallel existence of
anarchist ideological (“party”) organizations and labour unions.
Black Hundreds (Chernosotentsi) – the name applied in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century to members
of ultra-rightwing, conservative-monarchist and anti-semitic parties. The name originates from the
expression “black sotnia,” in the 16th – 17th centuries designating city wards (slobodas, sotnias) which were
populated by merchants and craftsmen who paid taxes to the treasury and were subject to compulsory
service to the state. In contrast, the inhabitants of the so-called “white slobodas” were dependent on the
feudal lords (boyars) and the church. Monarchists embraced the term, comparing themselves with the
legendary “black hundreds” of Nizhny Novgorod. In 1611–1612, the inhabitants of this city, led by their
starosta [elected leader] Kuzma Minin (Kuzma Minich Zakharyev), created a people’s volunteer militia
which defeated the Polish-Lithuanian army and drove it out of Moscow. The first Black Hundreds
organizations (Russian Assembly, Union of the Russian People) appeared in 1903 –1905. The most
influential conservative-monarchist parties were the Union of the Russian People, headed by A. I. Dubrovin,
and the Russian People’s Union of the Archangel Michael, led by V. M. Purishkevich. In 1907 more than
500,000 people took part in the movement. The goals they were striving for were the restoration of absolute
monarchy, the instituting of privileges for the Russian and Orthodox population, and the restricting of the
rights of Jews, Poles, and other ethnic and religious minorities. The social base of the movement consisted of
the conservative nobility and the merchant class, urban craftsmen and traders, and some workers. In Western
Ukraine, the movement attracted the support of Orthodox peasants who were in conflict with Polish Catholic
landowners. The Black Hundreds enjoyed the endorsement of the tsar Nicholas II. Funds for their activities
were made available by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire. As means of struggle, they
15
employed printed propaganda, mass demonstrations, elections to parliament (the State Duma), pogroms, and
terrorist acts. The Black Hundreds created their own militias, organizing numerous pogroms directed against
“enemies of the state” (Jews, revolutionaries, and intelligentsia). The movement peaked in October –
November 1905. Their militants also carried out a series of political assassinations. Among their victims: one
of the Bolshevik leaders N. E. Bauman, and important figures of the Constitutional Democratic Party M. Y.
Herzenstein and G. B. Yollos. In 1916 V. Purishkevich was one of the organizers and perpetrators of the
murder of G. E. Rasputin, who had acquired the reputation of a “saint” and a “miracle-worker” and exerted a
strong influence on the tsar and tsarina. The monarchists also created labour organizations, whose members
acted as strike-breakers during strikes. Anti-semitic propaganda played a major role in the activities of the
Black Hundreds. In 1913 in Kiev, their propaganda was instrumental in fabricating a court case against a
Jewish clerical employee, M. Beilis, on a charge of committing the ritual murder of A. Yushchinsky.
However, owing to pressure from liberal and socialist public opinion, the Black Hundreds’ scheme was
thwarted – the jurors acquitted Beilis. Subsequently, one of the leaders of the monarchists, N. E. Markov II,
gained notoriety as a popularizer and distributor of the anti-Semitic literary forgery “Protocols of the Elders
of Zion.” In the 1930s –1940s in the field of anti-semitic propaganda, he collaborated with the leading
ideologues of Hitler’s Germany, J. Goebbels and A. Rosenberg, publishing his own articles in various Nazi
publications. In the 1910s, the Black Hundreds movement went into decline. After the overthrow of the
monarchy in February 1917, monarchist organizations were banned. Most of them ceased to exist. In
contemporary Russia, the ideas of the Black Hundreds have found resonance not only among the members
of organizations of Russian nationalists, but also among artists, scientists, and even high-ranking public
officials.
Tsarina Maria – Maria Feodorovna, née Marie Sophie Frederikke Dagmar (1847–1928). Daughter of King of
Denmark Christian IX. In 1866–1894, wife of Alexander III Alexandrovich, tsar of Russia. Mother of Tsar
Nicholar II. Headed the Russian Red Cross and the Department of Institutions of the Empress Maria, which
administered almshouses, foundling hospitals, orphanages, and educational institutions for orphans. Maria
Feodorovna was in moderate opposition to Nicholas II, and was skeptical of his abilities as a statesman. For
example, in 1915 during World War I, she convinced her son to decline the post of Supreme Commander of
the Russian Army. Maria opposed the marriage of Nicholas with Princess Alix of Hesse-Darmstadt
(Alexandra Feodorovna), never concealing her hatred for her. Maria Feodorovna especially despised the
influence of the new tsarina on the policies of Nicholas II. The charge of espionage made against her by the
author of the leaflet mentioned in the text above was apparently based on rumours rather than any solid
evidence. After the overthrow of the monarchy, she left for Crimea. In April 1919, she emigrated to Great
Britain, then to Denmark. She declined to participate in any way in the political activities of Russian
emigrants.
Anarcho-communists-“chernoznamentsi” – a radical current in Russian anarchism at the beginning of the 20th
century. Emerging in 1905, it derived its name from the newspaper Chernoye znamye [Black banner]. Its
ideologues were I. S. Grossman, V. Lapidus, G. K. Askarov (Jacobson), and G. B. Sandomirsky. Grossman
criticized Kropotkin for remnants of “liberal federalism” and “elements of utopian idealism left over from
the 18th century.” He called for the eradication of “abstract-humanist tendencies” and the creation of
anarchist theory based on ideas about the struggle of mankind against forces of oppression (against nature,
originally, but, with the onset of class society, against the exploiting classes) as the moving force of history
(Chernoye znamye, 1905, № 1, p. 10). The chernoznamentsi considered their social base to be the working
class and the peasantry, as well as the unemployed and criminalized strata of the urban population. While
recognizing the importance of fighting for economic demands in developing the revolutionary consciousness
of workers and peasants, they rejected any legal forms of struggle. They opposed the establishment of trade
unions, offering illegal anarchist groups as an alternative. Giving the highest priority to an “energetic assault
on the property of the bourgeoisie,” the chernoznamentsi encouraged such means of struggle as individual
and mass terror, expropriations, strikes, sabotage, riots, and armed uprisings. The participation of anarchists
16
in the struggle for political freedoms was rejected on the grounds that this would lead to a mitigation of class
contradictions. At the 1st Conference of the chernoznamentsi in the autumn of 1905 in Białystok, a division
into two factions took place. The “bezmotivniki” [motiveless ones] considered their most urgent task
“motiveless anti-bourgeois terror,” i.e. the murder of bourgeoisie, landlords, state officials, etc. purely for
their membership in the “exploiting” classes. The second faction, the “communards,” while not rejecting
terror, proposed to concentrate all their efforts on organizing armed revolts in the cities with the goal of
creating “temporary revolutionary communes” which would provide examples of anarchist transformations
of society to working people. Along with the khlebovoltsi, the chernoznamentsi became one of the most
influential tendencies in Russian anarchism, exerting an impact on the labour movement and anarchist
groups in Białystok, Warsaw, Odessa, and Yekaterinoslav.
Anarcho-communist beznachaltsi – a radical insurrectionist tendency in Russian anarchism in the early 20th
century. Formed in 1904 – 1905. It derived its name from the Group of Anarchists-Communists
“Beznachaliye” [Without Authority]. The leading theoreticians of the beznachaltsi were S. M. Romanov and
N. V. Divnogorsky. They declared themselves adherents of an ideology which combined the ideas of P.
Kropotkin, M. Bakunin, M. Stirner, and S. Nechaev. They maintained close links with French anarchoindividualists
who were disciples of Albert Libertad. The beznachaltsi considered their own social base to be
the “lumpen-proletarian” strata of the cities (the unemployed, as well as semi-criminal groups), regarding
them as the bearers of a communist consciousness: “Tramps – as an element undermining the foundation of
slavish submissiveness – are a revolutionary element, cultivating the notion of the least amount of labour
and, owing to historical circumstances, the idea of human leisure” (Bidbey [S. M. Romanov], Concerning
Lucifer, the great spirit of rebellion, “irresponsibility,” anarchy and anarchism, [n. p., 1904], p. 19). In
addition, they were recruiting among students, bohemians, workers, and peasants. The beznachaltsi assumed
that insurgency, expropriation, and terror, carried out by groups of lumpen-proletarians, would set off a mass
worker-peasant revolt, which would mark the beginning of a social revolution. The need to engage in the
everyday struggle for socio-economic demands, to take part in labour unions and peasant organizations, was
therefore dispensed with. The beznachaltsi recognized only guerilla warfare, along with printed and oral
propaganda.
Vladimir Alexandrovich Sukhomlinov (1848–1926) – general, Minister of War of the Russian Empire from
March 1909 to July 1915. In the 1910s public opinion associated his name with corruption, and providing
protection for shady dealers and persons suspected of having links with foreign intelligence services. Many
Russian politicians blamed Sukhomlinov for the Russian Army’s lack of technical proficiency for modern
warfare, as well as inadequate supply services for the troops at the front. The opposition press and politicians
believed the cause of these problems to be the corrupt schemes used by Sukhomlinov in dispensing defense
orders. On July 15 1915 he was dismissed from his ministerial post. An investigation of Sukhomlinov’s
activities as minister was begun. On March 8 1916 he was discharged from the government service, and on
April 29 of the same year arrested and incarcerated in the Trubetskoy Bastion of the Peter and Paul Fortress
[Petrograd]. On October 11 1916, following the intervention of Nicholas II and a number of senior officials,
Sukhomlinov was transferred to house arrest. After the overthrow of the monarchy, he was put on trial on
August 10–12 1917. Sukhomlinov was found guilty of the unpreparedness of the army for war and sentenced
to life in prison at hard labour, commuted to imprisonment in the Peter and Paul Fortress and deprivation of
all the privileges of a retired general. After the October Revolution, he was moved to the Kresty Prison
[Petrograd]. On May 1 1918 he was released under an amnesty and soon emigrated to Germany.
Sergey Nikolaevich Myasoedov (1865–1915) – an officer of the Russian Army, the main figure of a sensational
spy scandal. His military service began in the 105th Orenburg infantry regiment. In 1892 he transferred to the
Special Corps of Gendarmes. From 1894 to 1901 he was the deputy, and from 1901 to 1907 the chief, of the
railway gendarme detachment at the frontier station of Verzhbolovo. Due to its location, Myasoedov was
17
able to establish connections with high officials of Russian and Germany who crossed the border. In
particular, he was on friendly terms with the German emperor, Wilhelm II. In 1907 Myasoedov was
transferred to the reserve and took up business activities. He was one of the founders of the Northwest
Steamship Company. In 1909 he became acquainted with the Minister of War, V. A. Sukhomlinov. Thanks to
his friendship with the minister, Myasoedov was reinstated in the service and settled into a job in the War
Ministry. In 1912 he was openly accused of espionage by A. I. Guchkov, a deputy in the State Duma from
the right-liberal Octobrist Party. And although an investigation failed to established Myasoedov’s
involvement in espionage, he was transferred to the reserve again. In August 1914, he voluntarily joined the
army and was appointed a translator in the headquarters of the 10th Army. On February 18 1915, he was
arrested by counter-intelligence on charges of espionage and looting. The grounds for suspicion were the
testimony of Lieutenant J. Kołakowski, who had been recruited by German intelligence while in German
captivity. Kołakowski testified that Myasoedov was identified to him by a German officer as an agent for
collecting and transmitting information. According to General B. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, Myasoedov was
caught red-handed trying to show secret documents to a German intelligence agent. On March 18 1915 he
was sentenced to death by a military court and hanged soon after. In connection with the Myasoedov case,
19 of his relatives and friends were arrested, including his wife Klara Samuilovna Goldstein, the daughter of
a rich merchant. The Myasoedov case dealt a severe blow to the reputation of his friend, the Minister of War
V. Sukhomlinov, who was soon forced into retirement. Discussions are still ongoing among researchers as to
whether Colonel Myasoedov was guilty of espionage. The version according to which he was innocent has
received wide distribution. Its proponents believe that this case was fabricated in an attempt by the higher
circles of the Russian empire to find a scapegoat for the succession of defeats. On the other hand, the
political opposition, in the form of liberal politicians and the generals close to them, used the case to
demonstrate to the public the moral corruption of the people close to the tsar Nicholas II.
Translated from the Russian by Malcolm Archibald from a text kindly supplied by Dr. Rublev and
originally presented by him at the conference “From the history of anarchism – the 200th anniversary
of the birth of Mikhail Bakunin” at the Institute of History and International Relations, University of
Szczecin (Poland), in May 2014.
18
1 See: Petrogradskaya federatsiya anarkhistov [Petrograd federation of anarchists], 1923 // International
Institute of Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, Senya Fléchine papers: f. 84 [an English translation is available
here: http://www.katesharpleylibrary.net/gxd3d2]; L. Lipotki, Russkoye anarkhicheskoye dvizheniye v
Severnoy Amerike. Istoricheskiye ocherki. [The Russian anarchist movement in North America. Historical
essays.] // Ibid. Lipotkin papers, B. 1.; N. Driker, Khersonskaya katorga v dni voyny [Kherson katorga (hard
labour) in days of war] // Katorga i ssylka. [Katorga and exile.], (Kiev: 1924), pp. 71–80; V. Khudoley,
Vospominaniya anarkhista [Memoirs of an anarchist] // Volna № 46 (1923), pp. 32–37; idem,
Anarkhicheskiye techeniya nakanune 1917 goda [Anarchist currents on the eve of 1917] // Mikhailu
Bakuninu. 1876–1926: Ocherki istorii anarkhicheskogo dvizheniya v Rossii. [To Mikhail Bakunin. 1876–
1926: Essays on the history of the anarchist movement in Russia.], (Moscow: 1926), pp. 314–322; G. P.
Maximoff, V gody voyny (Iz zapisok anarkhista) [During the years of war (From the notes of an
anarchist)] // Letopis’ revolyutsii. [Chronicle of the revolution.], Vol. 1 (Berlin: 1923), pp. 243–268; A. N.
Tyukhanov, Palubnaya pokhodka. [Sea legs.] (Moscow; Leningrad: 1931).
2 V. E. [V. M. Voline], Kray zavesy [The Edge of the curtain] // Golos truda № 50 (27 August 1915), p. 2.
3 Ya. Yakovlev, Russkiy anarkhizm v Velikoy Russkoy revolyutsii [Russian anarchism in the Great Russian
revolution], (Moscow: 1921); B. I. Gorev, Anarkhizm v Rossii (ot Bakunina do Makhno) [Anarchism in Russia
(from Bakunin to Makhno)], (Moscow: 1930); V. Zalezhskiy, Anarkhisty v Rossii [Anarchists in Russia],
(Moscow: 1930); Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, Anarkhizm v Rossii [Anarchism in Russia], (Moscow: 1939).
4 V. V. Komin, Anarkhizm v Rossii. [Anarchism in Russia.], (Kalinin: 1969), pp. 124–127; Ye. M. Kornoukhov,
Bor’ba partii bol’shevikov protiv anarkhizma v Rossii. [The Struggle of the Bolshevik Party against
anarchism in Russia.], (Moscow: 1981), pp. 107–112; S. N. Kanev, Revolyutsiya i anarkhizm: iz istorii bor’by
revolyutsionnykh demokratov i bol’shevikov protiv anarkhizma (1840–1917 gg.) [Revolution and
anarchism: from the history of the struggle of revolutionary democrats and Bolsheviks against anarchism
(1840–1917)], (Moscow; 1987), pp. 255–259. Certain topics have been examined by foreign researchers;
see, in particular: P. Avrich, The Russian anarchists (Princeton: 1967), pp. 116–119.
5 A. A. Shtyrbul, Anarkhistskoye dvizheniye v Sibiri v 1-y chetverti XX veka. Antigosudarstvennyy bunt i
negosudarstvennaya samoorganizatsiya trudyashchikhsya: teoriya i praktika. [The Anarchist movement in
Siberia in the 1st quarter of the 20th century. Anti-statist revolt and non-statist self-organization of workers:
theory and practice.], Part 1, (Omsk: 1996); V. V. Kriven’kiy, Anarkhisty [Anarchists] // Politicheskiye partii i
obshchestvo v Rossii 1914–1917 gg. [Political parties and society in Russia 1914–1917.], (Moscow: 1999),
pp. 46–61; P. O. Korotich, Rossiyskiye anarkhisty v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny: ideologiya, organizatsiya,
taktika (1914–1918 gg.) [Russian anarchists during the First World War: ideology, organization, tactics
(1914–1918)], Dissertation of candidate of historical science, (Moscow: 2000); V. P. Suvorov, Anarkhizm v
Tverskoy gubernii: vtoraya polovina XIX v. – 1918 g. [Anarchism in Tverskaya province: second half of he
19th cent. – 1918], Dissertation of candidate of historical science, (Tver: 2004); V. P. Sapon, Apollon
Andreyevich Karelin: Ocherk zhizni. [Apollon Andreyevich Karelin: the profile of a life.], (Nizhny Novgorod:
2009).
6 For details about the views of P. A. Kropotkin, see: G. B. Sandomirsky, Torzhestvo antimilitarizma. [The
Triumph of anti-militarism.], (Moscow, 1920); idem, Kropotkin i Frantsiya [Kropotkin and France] // Petr
Kropotkin. Sbornik statey. [Peter Kropotkin. Collection of articles.], (Petersburg, Moscow: 1922), pp. 168–
176; J. Grave, Iz moikh vospominaniy o Kropotkine [From my memories of Kropotkin] // Ibid., pp. 179–185;
I. Grossman-Roshchin, Kharakteristika tvorchestva P. A. Kropotkina. [Characteristics of the creative work of
P. A. Kropotkin], (Petersburg, Moscow: 1921); M. Pierrot, Kropotkin i voyna [Kropotkin and the War] // P. A.
Kropotkin i yego ucheniye. Internatsional’nyy sbornik, posvyashchonnyy desyatoy godovshchine smerti P.
A. Kropotkina. [P. A. Kropotkin and his teachings. An International collection, commemorating the tenth
anniversary of the death of P. A. Kropotkin], (Chicago: 1931), pp. 161–166; G. Woodcock and I.
Avakumovich, The Anarchist Prince: A Biography of Peter Kropotkin (London: 1950); M. Miller, Kropotkin
(Chicago: 1976), pp. 220–236; N. M. Pirumova, Petr Alekseyevich Kropotkin. (Moscow; 1972), pp. 183–189;
A. A. Mkrtichyan, «Vsyakogo ugnetatelya lichnosti ya nenavizhu» [“I hate anyone who oppresses
people”] // Trudy Komissii po nauchnomu naslediyu P.A. Kropotkina. [Proceedings of the Commission on
the scientific heritage of P. A. Kropotkin], (Moscow: 1992), pp. 3–17; I. V. Petushkova, Petr Alekseyevich
Kropotkin i I Mirovaya voyna [Peter Alekseyevich Kropotkin and the World War I] // Trudy
Mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii, posvyashchonnoy 150-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya P.A.
Kropotkina. [Proceedings of the International scientific conference commemorating the 150th anniversary of
the birth of PA Kropotkin.], 2nd ed., (Moscow: 1997), pp. 88–98; D. G. Kostenko, Oboronchestvo Kropotkina
v gody I mirovoy voyny [The Defencism of Kropotkin during World War I] // Trudy Mezhdunarodnoy
nauchnoy konferentsii, posvyashchonnoy 150-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya P.A. Kropotkina. 3rd ed. (Moscow:
2001), pp. 44–55.
7 P. A. Kropotkin, Rechi buntovshchika [Words of a Rebel], (Moscow, 2009), pp. 42–43.
8 P. A. Kropotkin, Khleb i Volya. Sovremennaya nauka i anarkhiya. [Bread and Freedom. Modern science
and anarchy], (Moscow, 1990), p. 499.
9 F. Domela-Nieuwenhuis, Vopros o militarizme [The Question of militarism] // Anarkhizm. Sbornik.
[Anarchism. A Collection.], (Moscow: 1999), pp. 235–237; G. B. Sandomirsky, Torzhestvo antimilitarizma,
pp. 10–11.
10 P. O. Korotich, , Rossiyskiye anarkhisty v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny, p. 51.
11 Khleb i Volya. [Bread and Freedom.], 1904, № 8, p. 6.
12 Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg. [Anarchists. Documents and materials. 1883–1935.],
Vol. 1 (Moscow: 1998), p. 51.
13 “Anarchist defencism” was not a term used by proponents of this tendency, but neither was it pejorative.
Pejorative terms applied to this anarchist defencism included “anarchist-patriotism” and “anarchistdemocratism.”
There were other varieties of defencism on the left, e. g. the “revolutionary defencism” of
the Russian SRs, Mensheviks, and even the Bolsheviks for a time.
14 P. Shreyyer, Nemetskiye anarkhisty i voyna [German anarchists and the war] // Nabat, May–June, 1915,
№ 2, p. 20; P. Avrich, Anarchist Portraits. (Princeton: 1988), p. 294. Mühsam soon switched to an anti-war
stance.
15 N. M.Puchkov-Bezrodnyy, Politicheskaya katorga ob imperialisticheskoy voyne [Political prisoners about
the imperialist war] // Proletarskaya revolyutsiya [Proletarian revolution], November 1924, № 11(34), p.
209.
16 P.A. Kropotkin, Anarkhiya, yeyo filosofiya, yeyo ideal: Sochineniya. [Anarchy, its philosophy, its ideal:
Collected works.], (Moscow: 1999), p. 704.
17 Ibid., p. 712.
18 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 5969 (M. I. Gol’dsmit), op. 2, d. 28, l. 74 ob.
19 Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI), f. 1023 (A. A. Borovoy), op. 1, d. 79, l. 64.
20 G. B. Sandomirsky, Torzhestvo antimilitarizma, pp. 42–43.
21 P. A. Kropotkin i yego ucheniye. Internatsional’nyy sbornik, posvyashchonnyy desyatoy godovshchine
smerti P. A. Kropotkina, pp. 341–343.
22 Michael Confino, ed., Anarchistes en exil: Correspondance inédite de Pierre Kropotkine à Marie
Goldsmith, 1897–1917, (Paris: 1995), p. 526.
23 P. N. Miliukov, Vospominaniya [Memoirs], (Moscow: 1991), pp. 153–154.
24 I. S. Knizhnik, Vospominaniya o P.A. Kropotkine i ob odnoy anarkhistskoy emigrantskoy gruppe
[Memories of P. A. Kropotkin and a certain anarchist emigrant group] // Krasnaya letopis’. [Red chronicle.],
1922, № 4, p. 35.
25 See: G. B. Sandomirsky, Kropotkin i Frantsiya, pp. 170–171; N. M. Pirumova, op. cit., pp. 184–185; I. V.
Petushkova, op. cit., p. 91; D. G. Kostenko, op. cit., pp. 44–46.
26 M. A. Bakunin, Parizhskaya kommuna i ponyatiye o gosudarstvennosti [The Paris Commune and the
concept of statism] // Bakunin M.A. Izbrannyye sochineniya. [M. A. Bakunin. Selected works.], Vol. 4
(Petersburg; Moscow: 1920), pp. 247–266; P. A. Kropotkin, Rechi buntovshchika, pp. 63–73.
27 Golos Truda, 1914, № 6, p. 3.
28 See: K. [M. I. Gol’dsmit] Bakunin i voyna [Bakunin and war] // Golos truda, 1914, 13 November, № 11. p.
1; P. A. Kropotkin, Anarkhiya, yeyo filosofiya, yeyo ideal: Sochineniya, p. 705.
29 G. B. Sandomirsky, Kropotkin i Frantsiya, p. 171; N. M. Pirumova, op. cit., p. 184.
30 M. A. Bakunin, Anarkhiya i Poryadok: sochineniya. [Anarchy and Order: collected works], (Moscow:
2000), p. 408.
31 P. A. Kropotkin, Anarkhiya, yeyo filosofiya, yeyo ideal: Sochineniya, pp. 718–719.
32 I. S. Grossman-Roshchin, K kritike osnov ucheniya P. A. Kropotkina, p. 152.
33 V. V. Dam’ye, Anarkhizm i natsional’nyy vopros v XIX–XX vekakh [Anarchism and the national question
in the 19th –20th centuries] // Natsional’naya ideya na yevropeyskom prostranstve v XX veke. Sbornik
statey. [The National idea in the European region in the 20th century. Collection of articles.], Vol. 2,
(Moscow: 2005), p. 204. This aspect of Kropotkin’s defencism was first noted by M. Pierrot (M. Pierrot, op.
cit., pp. 163–164. See also: A. A. Mkrtichyan, op. cit., p. 3).
34 V. V. Dam’ye, Zabytyy Internatsional. [The Forgotten International.], Vol. 1, (Moscow: 2006), p. 47.
35 A. Skirda, Individual’naya avtonomiya i kollektivnaya sila. Obzor libertarnykh idey i praktik ot Prudona
do 1939 g. [Individual autonomy and collective force. A Survey of libertarian ideas and practice from
Proudhon to 1939], (Paris, 2002), p. 129. Skirda’s book is available in English as: Facing the Enemy: a History
of Anarchist Organization from Proudhon to May 1948, (AK Press/Kate Sharpley Library, 2002).
36 Ibid.
37 V. V. Dam’ye, Zabytyy Internatsional, pp. 47–48.
38 Yu. N. Kir’yanov, Sotsial’no-politicheskiy protest rabochikh Rossii v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny (iyul’
1914 – fevral’ 1917 gg.). [Social-political protest by the workers of Russia during the First World War (July
1914 – February 1917).], (Moscow: 2005), p. 40.
39 Ibid., pp. 39–42.
40 Thus, the anarchist N. Driker recalled how in 1916 the warden of the Kherson central prison tried to
break a prisoners’ strike by appealing to patriotic sentiments (N. Driker, op. cit., p. 73).
41 Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg., Vol. 1, pp. 584–586.
42 K tovarishcham [To comrades] // Rabocheye Znamya. [The Labour Banner], 1915, March, № 1, p. 4.
43 P. A. Kropotkin i voyna [P. A. Kropotkin and the War] // Golos truda, 1915, 2 October, № 5, p. 1.
44 See: Po povodu desyatiletiya [Apropos of the decade] // Golos truda, 1915, 22 January, № 21, p. 1.
45 Golos truda, 1915, 3 September, № 51, p. 2.
46 A. Ge, Sotsialisticheskoye grekhopadeniye i vozrozhdeniye rabochego Internatsionala [Socialist moral
bankruptcy and the rebirth of the workers’ International] // Golos truda, 1915, № 21, p. 2.
47 Golos truda, 1915, № 33, p. 3.
48 Golos truda, 1915, № 41, p. 3.
49 K. Orgeiani [G. I. Gogeliya], Anarkhisty i voyna [Anarchists and the War] // Golos truda, 1915, 30 April, №
34, p. 2.
50 Nazrevayushchiy raskol v nemetskoy sotsial-demokratii [The Imminent split in German socialdemocracy
// Golos truda, № 15, 11 December 1914, p. 1; Rabochiy Al’fa [A. M. Gitterman], Pis’mo iz
Shveytsarii. Protiv techeniya. [Letter from Switzerland. Against the current.] // Golos truda, 1914, 18
December, № 16, p. 2.
51 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, t. 3, l. 29–30.
52 V. P. Sapon, op. cit., p. 41.
53 Rabochaya mysl’, 1916, № 1, column 13.
54 IISH: Lipotkin papers: B. 1, pp. 128–130, 133, 135–136.
55 According to an estimate of A. A. Borovoy, there were around 100 Russian anarchists in Paris alone in
early 1917. (RGALI, f. 1023, op. 1, d. 85, l. 1).
56 IISH;Maximov papers, Folder 1.
57 IISH: Lipotkin papers, B. 1, p. 305.
58 Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg., Vol. 1, pp. 589–590, 612–613, 616–621; GARF, f.
102, DP. OO, op. 1916, d. 12, t. 3, l. 270d–270d ob.
59 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, t. 3, l. 270d–270d ob.
60 IISH: Lipotkin papers, B. 1, pp. 301, 305, 321, 333–334, 342–345, 361, 433.
61 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, t. 3, l. 69.
62 Ibid., l. 99 ob.; op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 3, l. 11–11 ob., 14; GARF, f. 533. op. 3. d. 2281. l. 130.
63 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 57, l. 164 ob.
64 IISH: Lipotkin papers, B. 1, p. 144.
65 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 1, l. 115–117.
66 IISH: Lipotkin papers, B. 1, pp. 157–158; GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1914, d. 12, l. 216 ob.
67 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, t. 3, l. 133, 140, 152k; op. 1916, d. 12, t. 3, l. 134–134 ob., 184.
68 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, t. 3, l. 160–160 ob.; op. 1916, d. 12, t. 3, l. 1–7, 17, 104, 130; GARF,
f. 533, op. 3, d. 2281, l. 130.
69 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, t. 3, l. 14 ob., 293; GARF, f. 533, op. 3, d. 2281, l. 131.
70 P. O. Korotich, op. cit,. pp. 131–132.
71 Ibid., p. 133.
72 V. Khudoley, Anarkhicheskoye dvizheniye nakanune 1917 g., p. 322.
73 A. A. Shtyrbul, op. cit., p. 117.
74 Doklad petrogradskogo okhrannogo otdeleniya osobomu otdelu departamenta politsii [Report of the
Petrograd Okhrana division to the special section of the police department] // Politicheskiye partii i
obshchestvo v Rossii 1914 – 1917 gg. [Political parties and society in Russia 1914 – 1917] (Moscow: 1999),
p. 282; GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, l. 11; op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 57, l. 57.
75 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 46B, l. 35 ob.–36.
76 A. A. Dubovik, Chornoye znamya v stolitse imperii. Anarkhisty Peterburga v 1910–17 gg. [The Black
banner in the capital of the empire. Anarchists of Peterburg in 1910–17] // Novyy Svet. [New Light.], 1998,
Summer, № 2(42), p. 5.
77 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1914, d. 12, ch. 1, l. 217–218, 220, 235–236 ob.; op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 88B, l. 36.
78 V. A. Posse, Moy zhiznennyy put’. Dorevolyutsionnyy period (1864 – 1917 gg.). [My course of life. Prerevolutionary
period (1864 –1917.], (Moscow-Leningrad: 1929), pp. 480–481.
79 Ibid., pp. 481-483.
80 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 88 b. l. 29 – 30 b, 33.
81 P. O. Korotich, op. cit., p. 60.
82 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 175, ch. 2, l. 11–12.
83 Ibid., op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 46B, l. 16–19 ob.; P. O. Korotich, op. cit., pp. 155–156.
84 GARF, f. 124, op. 53, d. 96, l. 10; Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg., Vol. 1, pp. 605–606.
85 V. V. Kriven’kiy, Anarkhisty, p. 56; GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, ch. 46B, l. 17; ch. 57G, l. 2–14, 17–
17 ob.; d. 343, otd. 2, l. 69; op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 57B, l. 6.
86 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 175, ch. 2, l. 11–15.
87 V. Khudoley, Vospominaniya anarkhista, p. 37.
88 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, ch. 57G, l. 8, 14; ch. 58B, l. 1–2 ob.
89 Ibid., op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 46B, l. 15–15 ob., 20–24 ob., 34 ob.
90 Ibid., l. 4, 10–10 ob., 40, 42, 43–43 ob.
91 V. V. Kriven’kiy, Anarkhisty, pp. 57–58.
92 Ibid., pp. 576, 605, 608.
93 Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg., Vol. 1, pp. 589, 604, 609.
94 Ibid., pp. 576, 582, 596, 603, 604, 608.
95 Ibid. S. 582.
96 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 46, l. 6.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 G. Maximoff, op. cit., p. 248.
100 Ibid., pp. 248, 256–261, 265–266.
101 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 46B, l. 1–3; RGASPI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 1011, l. 1.
102 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 343, otd. 2, l. 62–63, 67.
103 V. S. Khudoley, Anarkhicheskiye techeniya nakanune 1917 goda, p. 320.
104 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 57, l. 106.
105 Ibid., op. 1915, d. 12, ch. 57G, l. 13.
106 Ibid., op. 1915, d. 12, ch. 57G, l. 13.
107 Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg., Vol. 1, pp. 582.
108 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, ch. 57G, l. 13.
109 Ibid.
110 Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. 1883–1935 gg., Vol. 1, p. 583.
111 Ibid., pp. 583, 597.
112 Doklad Petrogradskogo okhrannogo otdeleniya osobomu otdelu departamenta politsii, pp. 281–282.
113 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1915, d. 12, l. 10–10 ob.
114 Doklad Petrogradskogo okhrannogo otdeleniya osobomu otdelu departamenta politsii, p. 282.
115 A. N. Tyukhanov, op. cit., p. 138.
116 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 57. l, 15 ob.
117 GARF, f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 46B, l. 86
118 GARF. f. 102, DP OO, op. 1916, d. 12. ch. 88 B, l. 21 ob.; GARF, f. 102, DP. OO, op. 1916, d. 12, ch. 88, l. 1.
119 Ibid., op. 1914, d. 9, ch. 88B, l. 59–60; op. 1915, d. 9, ch. 46B, l. 37.
120 A. A. Shtyrbul, op. cit., p. 106.
121 N. Driker, op. cit., pp. 78–80; Puchkov-Bezrodnyy, op. cit., pp. 209–216.